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Transfer Pricing Aspects of Cash Pooling 
Arrangements in Light of the BEPS Action Plan
The author discusses the concept, underlying 
commercial rationale and types of cash pooling 
arrangements, and then analyses and comments 
on the transfer pricing aspects thereof. The 
analysis also takes into consideration the 
Actions under the OECD/G20 BEPS Project 
related to transfer pricing. The author discusses 
the impact of other BEPS-related actions 
(domestic and treaty law changes) on cash 
pooling arrangements, and ultimately suggests 
a way forward.
1.  Introduction: Cash Pooling
1.1.  The concept and commercial rationale
Multinational groups have been utilizing cash pools for 
several decades.1 Under such arrangements, multina-
tionals efficiently manage liquidity (working capital) 
requirements of the group by using surplus cash avail-
able with some cash pool participants (also referred to as 
“members of the group”) – typically subsidiaries, to fund 
the requirements of other cash pool participants. This 
enables members of a group to support each other finan-
cially before having to obtain external financing, which 
itself has become an expensive source of funding in light 
of the recent credit turmoil. In effect, multinationals lever-
age internal finance sources within the group in order to 
reduce external financing costs.2
Broadly, multinationals enter into cash pools to (i) cen-
tralize cash management and decision making power for 
financial arrangements, (ii) obtain favourable deposit and 
borrowing interest rates in light of their increased cash 
position, (iii) achieve cost savings on banking transac-
tions and (iv) acquire cash pool benefits available on the 
difference between debit and credit interest rates.3 Cash 
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pooling can be done on either a physical or notional basis 
(see below).
1.2.  Types of cash pooling
1.2.1.  Physical cash pooling
Physical cash pooling4 can be on either a zero balancing 
method5 or a target balancing method. Under the zero 
balancing approach, cash pool participants transfer their 
entire cash to a cash pool leader. Similarly, under a target 
balancing approach the cash pool participants transfer 
their entire cash that exceeds a certain balance to the cash 
pool leader. However, if the cash pool participants have a 
negative balance, the cash pool leader transfers funds to 
them.6 In essence, the arrangement ensures that the credit 
balances are moved (swept) into, and debit balances are 
covered (swept) out of a single master account.
The following example illustrates the mechanics of a physi-
cal cash pooling arrangement. A Co (Parent Co), a tax resi-
dent of State A, enters into a zero balancing cash pooling 
arrangement with its subsidiaries B Co, C Co and D Co 
resident in State B, State C and State D, respectively (all 
states are within the European Union). Under the arrange-
ment, A Co – the cash pool leader – sets up a bank account 
(master, header or concentration account) with BUS bank 
in State A. Similarly, B Co, C Co and D Co set up current 
bank accounts (sub-accounts that are linked to the master 
account) with BUS bank. The arrangement (zero balanc-
ing) provides that the bank balances of the cash pool par-
ticipants are transferred to or from the master account on 
a regular basis (for instance on a daily, weekly or monthly 
basis).
The bank balances of B Co and C Co show a positive 
balance of EUR 100 and EUR 150, respectively, whereas 
that of D Co shows a negative balance of EUR 200. Further, 
the debit (on negative balances)7 and credit (on positive 
balances) interest rates offered by BUS bank are 15% 
and 10%, respectively. On a stand-alone basis, B Co and 
C Co would earn EUR 10 and EUR 15 (combined inter-
est income of EUR 25), while D Co would have an inter-
est expense of EUR 30, thereby leading to a net interest 
expense of EUR 5 for the entire group.
4. Such arrangements are attractive in jurisdictions that do not apply domes-
tic withholding taxes on outbound interest payments. Even if withholding 
taxes are applied domestically, such arrangements are popular in jurisdic-
tions that levy nil withholding tax under an applicable tax treaty or the 
Interest and Royalties Directive (within the European Union).
5. Also known as the cash concentration or sweeping method.
6. S. Tredicine, Tax Treatment of International Cash Pooling Arrangements, 4 
Derivs. & Fin. Instrums. 4 (2002), at 151, Journals IBFD; S. Damji, I. Dia-
konova & U. Brügger, Transfer Pricing DNA as a Tool to Achieve the Optimal 
Balance of Risks and Efficiency, Der Schweizer Treuhänder 3 (2006), at 189.
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However, by entering into a cash pooling arrangement 
and concentrating the funds in the master account owned 
(legally) by A Co, the entire group is in a surplus of EUR 
50 (EUR 250 – EUR 200) on which A Co can earn interest 
income8 of EUR 5 from BUS bank (even though A Co is 
entitled to receive the income from a legal perspective, the 
considerations outlined in section 2. need to be taken into 
account to determine whether A Co is entitled to receive 
the interest income from a transfer pricing perspective). 
To attain this advantage, B Co and C Co have deposited 
cash in the master account (provided a loan), while D Co 
has withdrawn cash from the master account (received a 








B Co C Co D Co Total
Balance 100 150 (200) 50 50
Interest 
rate (%)
 10  10   15  – 10
Interest  10  15  (30)  (5)  5 10
Typically, at one end of the spectrum, in physical cash 
pools, the cash pool leader (or the treasury entity of the 
group) may act as a financial services entity with an exter-
nal bank structure.10 Under such structures, the cash pool 
leader would enter into a cash management services agree-
ment (for administrative convenience) with a bank pursu-
ant to which the bank accounts of the cash pool partici-
pants are netted out for the purposes of determining the 
balance on which the deposit or overdraft interest rate is 
applied. Based on these balances, the external bank will 
have to pay or receive from the cash pool.11 Broadly, the 
cash pool leader engages in borrowing and lending of 
funds, but operates with a limited amount of equity at risk 
in relation to the functions performed and risks assumed. 
For instance the cash pool leader may not have the nec-
essary funds to bear the credit risk (risk associated with 
a cash pool member defaulting on its borrowing) in the 
event of its realization.
At the other end of the spectrum, the cash pool leader may 
act as an entrepreneurial entity (in-house bank structure)12 
wherein it carries out functions, assumes risks and employs 
assets as an external bank. In essence, the cash pool leader 
acts as counterparty to the transactions and bears risks.13 
In such situations, in terms of functions, the cash pool 
leader plans the financial needs of the multinational group, 
develops the cash pooling concept, and implements the 
cash pooling concept by (i) negotiating the cash pooling 
8. The excess cash may also be invested in short-term limited risk securities. 
PWC, supra n. 1, at 138.
9. These loans are mostly regarded as short-term loans. PWC, supra n. 1, at 
138.
10. A financial services entity is an entity that is responsible for the receipt 
and payment of interest within a group of companies. Russo & Moerer, 
supra n. 1, at 15.
11. J. Hollas & G. Hands, Transfer Pricing and Intra-group Cash Pooling (17 
Sept. 2013), available at http://www.tpa-global.com/news/2013/09/17/
transfer-pricing-and-intra-group-cash-pooling. See also the ConocoPhil-
lips case in section 2.3.3.1.
12. Hollas & Hands, supra n. 11.
13. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 30.
arrangement and interest rates, (ii) drafting intercompany 
loan agreements, (iii) coordinating the cash pool and (iv) 
managing internal offsets of debit and credit positions. 
In terms of risks, in addition to bearing the credit risk, 
the cash pool leader also bears the interest rate risk (risk 
associated with changes in the market interest rates) and 
foreign exchange risk (risk that exists when the financial 
transactions between the cash pool members are denomi-
nated in a currency other than that of the base currency of 
the cash pool leader).14
The difference between an external bank structure and an 
in-house bank structure is that under the former, the cash 
pool participants have intercompany accounts with an 
external bank, whereas under the latter, the cash pool par-
ticipants have intercompany accounts with the in-house 
bank (treasury entity). This would imply that under an 
in-house bank structure, as the depositor cash pool par-
ticipants have made deposits with the treasury entity (not 
with an external bank), they assume a significantly higher 
credit risk with respect to these deposits.15 From a trans-
fer pricing perspective, it is crucial that the transactions 
be appropriately delineated and a proper comparability 
analysis including a functional analysis be undertaken to 
determine the actual roles and responsibilities of the par-
ticipants, as such arrangements may fit into one of these 
categories or maybe somewhere between the two spec-
trums.
1.2.2.  Notional cash pooling
Under a notional16 cash pooling arrangement,17 cash is 
not physically transferred to any bank account. This type 
of arrangement does not lead to any intra-group loans.18 
Under the arrangement, the cash pool participants operate 
accounts directly with the bank. The bank calculates the 
debit and credit interest rates on each participant’ s indivi-
dual bank account and then subsequently calculates the 
combined notional balance of all bank accounts (for 
instance on a daily, weekly or monthly basis).19 Thereafter, 
the cash pool benefit is determined based on the notional 
balance. The cash pool benefit is paid directly to the cash 
pool leader (master account in the name of the cash pool 
leader).20 Typically, in notional cash pools, the cash pool 
leader does not act as counterparty to the transactions 
and does not bear risks.21 In such situations, the cash pool 
leader only coordinates the cash pool and manages inter-
14. In these situations, the cash pool leader could be entitled to a spread on 
the interest rates. See section 2.5.
15. Hollas & Hands, supra n. 11.
16. Also known as interest compensation cash pool.
17. Such arrangements are attractive in (i) jurisdictions that apply withhold-
ing taxes that cannot be completely eliminated by tax treaties and (ii) juris-
dictions that have legal restrictions (typically developing countries such as 
Brazil, China or India) which restrict the physical transfer of funds. Storck, 
supra n. 1, at 33-34. However, several countries (e.g. the United States 
and Germany) do not allow notional cash pooling. S. Hillman, Notional 
vs. Physical Cash Pooling Revisited, International Treasurer (2011), at 1 
available at http://www.treasuryalliance.com/assets/publications/cash/
Treasury_Alliance_Notional_Physical_Pooling_Revisited.pdf.
18. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 30; Diakonova, supra n. 1, at 61.
19. PWC, supra n. 1, at 138.
20. As an alternative, the bank could pay the benefit directly to the partici-
pants by amending the interest rates. Tredicine, supra n. 6, at 152.
21. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 31.
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nal offsets of debit and credit positions. Essentially, it acts 
as a service provider. Moreover, in such cash pools, the 
cash pool participants may have to provide cross-guaran-
tees to the bank to prevent the bank from bearing the risk 
associated with a cash pool participant’ s defaulting.
2.  Transfer Pricing Aspects of Cash Pooling 
Arrangements
2.1.  Intra-group transactions
Article 9(1) of both the OECD22 and UN23 Model Conven-
tions provides that transactions between associated en-
terprises must be at arm’ s length. This means that, from a 
transfer pricing perspective, intercompany loans provided 
in physical cash pooling arrangements must be at arm’ s 
length (the funding itself and interest rates). This issue is 
not relevant for notional cash pooling arrangements, as 
there is no real movement of funds. Further, if one assumes 
that the cash pool is in an overall negative balance, the bank 
would grant a loan to the cash pool leader (under physi-
cal arrangements) or to the cash pool participant directly 
(under notional arrangements) pursuant to a credit facility 
on which interest must be paid.24 More often than not, a 
member of the cash pool must provide a bank with a guar-
antee on behalf of another participant to cover the default 
risk associated with this loan. Such guarantees also must 
be at arm’ s length.25 Furthermore, under both types of 
arrangements, the remuneration that the cash pool leader 
obtains must be at arm’ s length. Moreover, a determina-
tion of an arm’ s length allocation of the cash pool benefit 
among the cash pool participants needs to be undertaken 
in either type of cash pool.
In 2013, the OECD initiated its work on BEPS (the BEPS 
Project).26 It was contended that the current transfer pricing 
system had led to serious BEPS-related concerns. Never-
theless, replacing the arm’ s length principle was not viable, 
and a better solution is to ensure that transfer pricing out-
comes are in line with “value creation”.27 In this regard, the 
current OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2010),28 which 
propagate the use of the arm’ s length principle, have signif-
icantly been revised in light of Actions 8-1029 and Action 
22. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital art. 9(1) (26 July 
2014), Models IBFD.
23. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries art. 9(1) (2011), Models IBFD.
24. PWC, supra n. 1, at 138.
25. Id.
26. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 
2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
27. V. Chand & S. Wagh, The Profit Split Method: Status Quo and Outlook in 
Light of the BEPS Action Plan, 21 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2014), at 405, 
Journals IBFD.
28. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD 2010), International Organizations’ Documen-
tation IBFD.
29. These Actions have led to changes in Chapter I (guidance for applying the 
arm’ s length principle), Chapter II (transfer pricing methods), Chapter VI 
(intangibles), Chapter VII (intra-group services) and Chapter VIII (cost 
contribution agreements). OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with 
Value Creation – Actions 8-10 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing 5 Oct. 2015), International 
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
1330 of the BEPS Action Plan. This will lead to the pub-
lication of revised OECD Guidelines in the near future. 
The following analysis takes into consideration both the 
current and revised OECD guidance.
2.2.  Recognition of arrangements
Only members of a multinational group enter into cash 
pooling arrangements in order to benefit from group syn-
ergies.31 Such arrangements are rarely found between inde-
pendent parties. As a starting point, the question arises as 
to whether the arm’ s length principle should be applied to 
such arrangements even though independent enterprises 
typically do not enter into such arrangements. The OECD 
Guidelines highlight that practical difficulties arise when 
applying the arm’ s length principle to such situations. This 
is because “little or no direct evidence of what conditions 
would have been established by independent enterprises” 
exists.32 Nevertheless, the OECD Guidelines provide that 
the fact that independent enterprises do not enter into 
such transactions does not necessarily imply that the con-
trolled transactions are not at arm’ s length. Thus, the arm’ s 
length nature of cash pooling arrangements must be ascer-
tained (see sections 2.3.-2.6.).
A related question arises as to the circumstances under 
which such arrangements may be disregarded. In principle, 
if the controlled transactions are accurately delineated,33 
with the effect that the economic substance of the cash 
pooling arrangement (such as functions, assets and risks 
assumed by the members to the arrangement, taking 
into account the economic circumstances and business 
strategies)34 is aligned with the legal arrangements35 (con-
tractual terms), tax authorities should not disregard the 
transaction.36 However, even if the form and economic 
substance coincide, the OECD Guidelines provide that the 
transactions may be recharacterized if the arrangement, 
viewed holistically, differs “from those which would have 
been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a 
30. This Action has led to changes in Chapter V (transfer pricing documen-
tation). OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Coun-
try Reporting – Action 13: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing 5 Oct. 2015), International 
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
31. H.M. Andresen, ConocoPhillips Case: Implications in Norway and Beyond, 
17 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2010), at 464, Journals IBFD. See also S. Assef 
& D. Boer, Safe Dive into a Cash Pool, Treasury & Risk (1 Oct. 2013), 
available at http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/2013/10/01/safe-dive-into-
a-cash-pool?t=treasury-management&page=3. 
32. OECD Guidelines, para. 1.11.
33. The application of the arm’ s length principle requires a comparison of 
the related-party transactions with comparable uncontrolled transac-
tions. Two aspects of this analysis are to (i) identify the contractual terms 
between related parties and the economically relevant aspects attached to 
such terms in order to properly delineate the related-party transactions 
and (ii) undertake a comparability analysis to compare the controlled 
transactions with uncontrolled transactions. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final 
Reports, supra n. 29, para. 1.33. However, if the form does not correspond 
to the economic substance, the economic substance should be used to 
delineate the transactions. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 
29, paras. 1.42-1.50.
34. The economically relevant characteristics must be documented in the 
local file. OECD, Action 13 Final Report, supra n. 30, para. 22.
35. However, if the form does not correspond to the economic substance, the 
economic substance should be used to delineate the transactions. OECD, 
Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 29, paras. 1.42-1.50.
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commercially rational manner”.37 In the author’ s opinion, 
if the commercial rationale of entering into a cash pooling 
arrangements is demonstrated (such as savings on banking 
costs, the possibility to obtain favourable credit and debit 
interest rates and centralization of treasury functions), tax 
authorities should not disregard such arrangements.
2.3.  Intra-group loans
2.3.1.  The arm’ s length analysis
The movement of funds among the cash pool leader and 
cash pool participants in physical cash pooling arrange-
ments creates intercompany loans (mostly short-term 
loans although long-term positions are also feasible).38 
Two questions39 need to be answered, namely (i) whether 
the intercompany loans40 (deposits and drawdowns) are 
at arm’ s length and (ii) whether the interest rates on such 
loans are arm’ s length.
Generally, a transfer pricing analysis of intercompany 
loans involves a two-step process. First, the characteristics 
of the borrowing entity must be established. This analysis 
should address the following questions:41 (i) could the bor-
rowing entity obtain a similar level of debt from a third-
party lender42 and (ii) would the borrowing entity actu-
ally borrow a similar amount at arm’ s length, given the 
performance of its business.43 Essentially, this step entails 
a credit rating evaluation44 of the borrower on a stand-
alone basis (adjustment to the credit rating of the borrower 
will be required to be made, taking into consideration the 
implicit support that it receives from being associated with 
the entire group; see section 2.4.).
Second, an arm’ s length interest rate45 needs to be estab-
lished in light of a credit rating evaluation.46 In practi-
cal terms, the screening process applied by commercially 
37. OECD Guidelines, para. 1.65; OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 
29, paras. 1.122-1.125.
38. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 32. However, such long-term positions could pos-
sibly be recharacterized as long-term loans.
39. Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 6, at 189.
40. It is assumed that the loans qualify as debt under the relevant domestic 
tax rules. PWC, supra n. 1, at 131.
41. Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 15; Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 
6, at 189.
42. The could analysis focuses on what a lender would be prepared to lend to 
the borrower, taking into consideration, for example, the latter’ s capacity 
to borrow, risk of default, assets that can be provided as security, liabilities 
that can have a negative effect on the intercompany loans and the indus-
try in which the borrower operates. Her Majesty’ s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC), Transfer Pricing: Thin Capitalisation Legislation and Principles: 
The “Would” and “Could” Arguments, INTM 413030.
43. The would analysis focuses on how much, and under what conditions, a 
borrower would have borrowed at arm’ s length, taking into consideration 
(i) whether the borrower would have taken a loan at arm’ s length given 
its financial situation, (ii) the amount of debt and whether taking that 
amount leaves room to absorb cyclical or seasonal variations, unforeseen 
events or a fluctuation in interest rates or profits, (iii) its the costs of bor-
rowing and (iv) its debt servicing ability and the possibility to have suf-
ficient cash to operate as a profitable organisation. HMRC, supra n. 42.
44. This evaluation estimates the ability of the borrowing entity to repay its 
debt.
45. Interest (fixed or floating) consists of a base rate (risk-free rate) that is 
determined on the basis of currency and maturity and a credit spread 
that is determined on the basis of the risks undertaken by the lender with 
respect to the lending transaction.
46. Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 6, at 189; Russo & Moerer, supra 
n. 1, at 15.
independent banks to determine the creditworthiness of 
the borrower needs to be undertaken. The credit rating47 
obtained pursuant to the multi-pronged creditworthi-
ness analysis48 lays the foundation to determine under 
what conditions a loan can be issued in related-party set-
tings. Furthermore, the factors influencing the interest 
rate determination49 (terms and conditions of the loan), 
such as the currency, tenure of the loan, seniority or sub-
ordination, type (fixed or floating), loan repayment sched-
ule, pre-payment options, convertibility (into equity) 
and security, need to be analysed to determine the arm’ s 
length interest rate.50 The most common transfer pricing 
method applied to benchmark interest rates is the compar-
able uncontrolled price (CUP) method,51 using internal52 
or external CUPs53 as may be available.54
2.3.2.  Application to cash pooling arrangements
With respect to cash pooling arrangements, in determin-
ing the arm’ s length credit or debit interest rates on the 
intercompany deposits and loans, respectively, it is essen-
tial that the creditworthiness of the borrower participants 
(cash pool leader or cash pool participants depending 
on the structure), on a stand-alone basis, be ascertained 
(adjusted for implicit support).55 The analysis lays down 
the basis for determining the arm’ s length spread56 that can 
be added to the base interest rate (e.g. LIBID,57 LIBOR58 
or other bank rates). Thereafter – based on the credit 
ratings, the contractual terms (the loan terms and con-
ditions) and actual conduct of the parties – CUPs (inter-
nal or external)59 need to be found to benchmark the con-
47. References can be made to Moody’ s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’ s rating 
agencies. Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 19-29.
48. The analysis includes an analysis of the business/industry in which the 
borrower operates, an operational risk assessment of the borrower, finan-
cial statement analysis, cash flow analysis, forecast and probability mea-
surement analysis, credit scoring analysis and comparable analysis. For a 
detailed description of these parameters, see Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, 
at 16-30.
49. The US transfer pricing regulations also provide that the credit rating of 
the borrower should be ascertained with respect to determining interest 
rates. US: Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(D) (1994).
50. Damji, Diakonova & Brügger, supra n. 6, at 188; Bakker, supra n. 1, at 
28-29.
51. Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 29. In some cases, tax authorities have also 
accepted the build-up approach. Essentially, this approach estimates a 
risk-free rate to which a credit risk and term risk premium is added, based 
on spreads available at corporate bonds. In other cases, tax authorities 
have also accepted bank quotes to determine if the interest rate received 
(paid by the borrower) is at arm’ s length.
52. Internal CUPs may exist. More often than not, adjustments will be 
required to improve comparability. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 29.
53. External CUPs may exist where it is possible to find comparable loans 
between unrelated parties in the public domain. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 29.
54. In situations where comparables do not exist, the result obtained through 
the application of the fair market yield curves (e.g. the Bloomberg yield 
curves) have been accepted. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 29.
55. PWC, supra n. 1, at 140-141.
56. The OECD Guidelines provide that “in respect of financial services such 
as loans … remuneration would generally be built into the spread and it 
would not be appropriate to expect a further service fee to be charged”. 
OECD Guidelines, para. 7.15.
57. The London Interbank Bid Rate. See http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/l/libid.asp.
58. The London Interbank Offer Rate. See http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/l/libor.asp.
59. The external CUP analysis, which is based on information obtained in the 
public domain (databases such as Loan Connector), results in interquartile 
ranges of base interest rates and credit spreads that can be used as arm’ s 
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trolled interest rate. If CUPs are unavailable, the taxpayer 
could explore options realistically available to it to justify 
the arm’ s length nature of its dealing,60 taking into con-
sideration the contributions of all cash pool members. 
For instance, net depositors could demonstrate the arm’ s 
length nature of interest rates by benchmarking them with 
the option of depositing the funds with an external bank, 
although such an alternate option was rejected in the court 
cases discussed below. Those cases dealt with the arm’ s 
length determination of interest rates in cash pooling 
arrangements.
2.3.3.  Court decisions on interest payments
2.3.3.1.  The ConocoPhillips case 61
ConocoPhillips Inc, a US-headquartered company, owned 
subsidiaries worldwide. It also owned two subsidiaries in 
Norway, namely COPSAS and NCOPAS. ConocoPhil-
lips Inc, along with its subsidiaries (as cash pool par-
ticipants), entered into a multi-currency physical cash 
pooling arrangement with Bank of America (bank). The 
group’ s treasury centre, ConocoPhillips UK, managed the 
arrangement. Pursuant to the arrangement, the cash pool 
participants were required to place their surplus cash with 
the bank (sub-accounts). Interest was debited or credited 
based on the group’ s top account balance (sub-accounts 
aggregated into the master account). A positive balance 
on the top account entitled the arrangement to earn an 
interest rate of LIBID minus 25 basis points (interest from 
the bank), whereas a negative balance attracted an inter-
est rate of LIBOR plus 25 basis points (payment to the 
bank). Generally, a spread of 62.5 basis points was avail-
able, as the LIBOR rate was 12.5 basis points higher than 
the LIBID rate. However, deposits and withdrawals by the 
cash pool participants to/from the cash pool respectively 
attracted the same interest rates of LIBID minus 25 basis 
points (interest rate on net deposits).
In this case, the top account always reflected a positive 
balance. Furthermore, ConocoPhillips Inc guaranteed the 
accounts even though all the entities in the group were 
jointly and severally liable for the arrangement. COPSAS 
and NCOPAS were net depositors to the arrangement and 
were entitled to a deposit interest rate of LIBID minus 25 
basis points. The key question that arose in this case, from 
a Norwegian tax and transfer pricing perspective, was 
whether the deposit interest rate received by the taxpay-
ers, namely COPSAS and NCOPAS, was at arm’ s length.
The taxpayers argued that independent parties do not 
enter into cash pooling arrangements. Therefore, it was not 
possible to compare controlled transactions with uncon-
trolled transactions. Consequently, it was necessary to 
compare the closest option that exists between indepen-
dent parties. The closest option that was available to the 
length credit and debit interest rates within the cash pool arrangement. 
PWC, supra n. 1, at 141. See also the Bombardier case discussed in section 
2.3.3.2.
60. OECD Guidelines, paras. 1.34 & 9.59-9.64. See also S. Parekh, The Concept 
of “Options Realistically Available” under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines, 22 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 5 (2015), at 297-307, Journals IBFD.
61. Andresen, supra n. 31, at 461-463. See also Bakker, supra n. 1, at 31-32.
taxpayers was to deposit the funds with an independent 
bank.62 Nevertheless, as the interest rates that the taxpay-
ers received from the arrangement was higher than the rate 
that they could have achieved by depositing the funds with 
an independent bank, it was contended that the transac-
tions were at arm’ s length. It was also contended that the 
cash pooling benefit should not be divided among the cash 
pool members. As the cash pool benefit was created by the 
treasury entity, it should reside with that entity.63
The tax authorities argued that the cash pooling arrange-
ment should be seen in a holistic manner, and that the 
cash pooling benefit should be split among the partici-
pants in light of their respective contributions (bargain-
ing power). The alternate option available to the taxpayers 
(i.e. depositing the funds with a bank) ignored the actual 
cash pooling arrangement and the bargaining power posi-
tion of the parties. It was also contended that deposits and 
withdrawals by the cash pool participants to/from the cash 
pool respectively attracted the same interest rates of LIBID 
minus 25 basis points. Accordingly, net depositors were in 
a similar situation to net debtors, even though the former’ s 
bargaining power (on account of their cash balances) was 
higher than that of the latter. Thus, net debtors were enjoy-
ing the cash pool benefit (as opposed to the net depositors) 
due to similar interest rates.
The Bogarting Court of Appeal decided in favour of the 
tax authorities. The Court held that the pooling benefit 
should be split among all the participants in light of their 
respective contributions. Net depositors to the arrange-
ment were, indeed, in a better bargaining position, as they 
were the ones that were creating profit opportunities for 
the group. Accordingly, if they had entered into similar 
arrangements with independent parties, they would have 
obtained a higher interest rate in light of their bargain-
ing position. Therefore, the taxpayers did not receive an 
appropriate compensation that reflected their contribu-
tions. Accordingly, the taxable income of the taxpayers 
was increased.
An interesting question arises within the context of the 
case, namely whether the deposit and lending rates offered 
by the bank can be used as CUPs for the rates charged by 
the cash pool leader to the cash pool participants (depos-
itors and lenders). In the author’ s opinion, a mechanical 
transposition of the rates charged by the bank to the rates 
charged by the cash pool leader to its members does not 
reflect an arm’ s length rate. If the bank charges the cash 
pool leader a debit interest rate of LIBOR plus 25 basis 
points on negative balances in the master account, that 
rate should not be mechanically applied by the cash pool 
leader to funds provided to a participant. Similarly, if the 
bank provides the cash pool leader with a credit interest 
rate of LIBID minus 25 basis points on positive balances in 
62. The author understands that the taxpayers presented external CUP evi-
dence on deposit interest rates that could have been achieved from inde-
pendent banks.
63. The author could not manage to obtain a detailed functional analysis 
of the cash pooling arrangement. Accordingly, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the treasury entity should have been compensated as an entre-
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the master account, that rate should not be mechanically 
applied by the cash pool leader to funds deposited by a 
participant. This is because a direct application of the rates 
does not take into account the functional and risk analysis 
of the parties to the arrangement. A credit rating analy-
sis of all the pool members is essential to justify the arm’ s 
length lending and borrowing rates. Accordingly, differ-
ent deposit and lending rates could apply to the pool par-
ticipants.64
2.3.3.2.  The Bombardier case 65
The Canadian Bombardier Group owned subsidiaries 
worldwide. It also owned a subsidiary in Denmark (the 
taxpayer). The taxpayer entered into a zero-balancing 
cash pooling arrangement with a related Swiss entity that 
was appointed as the cash pool administrator. Pursuant 
to the arrangement, the taxpayer was required to deposit 
its surplus funds in the cash pool. Furthermore, the tax-
payer could also borrow the deposited funds and with-
draw additional funds, if required. The Swiss entity was 
responsible for establishing cash pool accounts, coordi-
nating the cash pool, providing documentation and deter-
mining interest rates. Furthermore, the Swiss entity also 
took care of other treasury-related activities.66 Under the 
arrangement, deposits into the pool attracted interest rates 
of daily overnight bank rates minus 50 basis points, while 
withdrawals attracted interest rates of daily overnight bank 
rates plus 115 basis points. According to the taxpayer, the 
spread on deposits was equal to deposit rates offered by 
independent banks, and such deposits enabled the Swiss 
entity to negotiate external party funding at cheaper rates 
for the Bombardier Group.
During the years under audit, the taxpayer had surplus 
cash and deposited these amounts under several short-
term agreements (and received interest). However, due to 
insufficient liquidity management, the taxpayer had a neg-
ative balance for a few months and was therefore required 
to withdraw funds (and pay interest). The key question 
that arose in this case, from a Danish transfer pricing per-
spective, was whether the interest rate received/paid by the 
taxpayers was at arm’ s length.
The Swiss entity did not have its own independent credit 
rating. However, the Bombardier Group had a credit rating 
of Ba2/BB. Moreover, the taxpayer failed to provide any 
documentation explaining how the rates were calculated. 
Furthermore, from a risk appetite perspective, the tax-
payer bore the debtors risks with respect to the depos-
its. However, the Swiss entity did not bear any risks with 
respect to the withdrawals by the taxpayer, as the former 
already had its deposits.
64. M. Breggen, Netherlands, in Transfer Pricing and Intra-Group Financing, 
supra n. 1, at 436-437.
65. E. Vistisen, Bombardier Case: First Published Cash Pool Decision, 21 Intl. 
Transfer Pricing J. 3 (2014), at 464, Journals IBFD. See also E. Vistisen, 
Bombardier Cash Pool Decision (21 Jan. 2014), available at http://www.
vistisenlaw.com/bombardier-cash-pool-decision.
66. Such as liquidity, interest and risk management, insurance, letters of credit 
and accounting for European operations.
The tax authorities did not agree with the spread earned 
by the Swiss entity and equalized the deposit interest rates 
and withdrawal interest rates. Further, they calculated the 
interest on the net balance of the deposits. Moreover, due 
to the lack of documentation, the tax authorities deter-
mined the interest rate based on an external CUP analy-
sis, taking into consideration the credit rating of the Bom-
bardier Group. The fact that the interest rate received/paid 
by the taxpayer was equivalent to the interest rate avail-
able from independent parties was not considered rele-
vant, as the latter rates did not take into consideration the 
credit risk assumed by the taxpayer (a similar argument 
was made by the tax authorities and upheld by the Court 
of Appeals in the ConocoPhillips case). Nevertheless, the 
tax authorities agreed that the Swiss subsidiary should be 
paid a service fee of 0.25% for its treasury-related activities.
The taxpayer appealed the decision of the tax authorities 
before the Danish Administrative Tax Court. The Court 
upheld most of the findings of the tax authorities. In par-
ticular, the Court held that the Swiss entity was not entitled 
to a spread (– 0.5 to + 1.15). This was because that entity 
did not bear the credit risk with respect to the arrange-
ments. The author agrees with the findings of the Court. If 
the cash pool administrator does not bear any credit risks, 
it should not be entitled to a spread. On the other hand, it 
should be entitled to a service fee for the administrative 
activities it undertakes (see section 2.5.).
2.4.  Intra-group guarantees67
2.4.1.  The arm’ s length analysis
The question arises as to how do to determine the arm’ s 
length charge with respect to guarantees. The OECD 
Guidelines,68 in the context of intra-group services, 
provide that two questions that must be answered with 
respect to the provision of a guarantee, namely (i) whether 
an intra-group service is provided and, if so, (ii) whether 
the intra-group charge with respect to such service is at 
arm’ s length.69
The response to the first question depends on whether 
the guarantee provides the recipient with economic and 
commercial value to enhance its commercial position.70 
The commercial position of the guarantee recipient is 
enhanced when the provision of a guarantee improves 
the credit rating of the recipient in such a manner that the 
recipient can obtain a loan at lower interest rates (or inter-
est rates applicable to the guarantor). In this regard, a dis-
tinction must be drawn between passive association and 
active promotion of a multinational group’ s attributes71 
(or deliberate concerted action).
67. The author focuses on the provision of explicit guarantees within a mul-
tinational group, as such instruments create a legally enforceable com-
mitment for the guarantor.
68. OECD Guidelines, para. 7.5.
69. For a detailed analysis, see V. Averyanova & J. Sampat, Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Intra-Group Financial Guarantees in Light of the BEPS Action 
Plan, 22 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 6 (2015), Journals IBFD.
70. OECD Guidelines, para. 7.6.
71. OECD Guidelines, para. 7.13.
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The following example can be used to illustrate this dif-
ference. The credit rating of a parent company in the XYZ 
group is AAA. Its subsidiary’ s stand-alone credit rating 
is Baa. On an individual basis, the subsidiary can obtain 
a loan from a bank at 6%. However, due to its affiliation 
to the group, the subsidiary’ s credit rating is pushed up 
to A.72 This enables the subsidiary to obtain a loan at 
4% from independent banks. Nevertheless, the parent 
company decides to provide a guarantee to its subsidiary 
which then pushes up the credit rating of the subsidiary 
to AAA. This deliberate concerted group action enables 
the subsidiary to obtain a loan at 2% from independent 
banks. The revised OECD Guidelines73 (clearly inspired by 
the GE Capital case)74 provide that if the subsidiary has a 
higher credit rating, due to its group membership (taking 
the loan at 4%), than the credit rating it could achieve on an 
individual basis (taking the loan at 6%), no service is pro-
vided by the parent to the subsidiary, as the latter company 
receives only an incidental benefit by being associated with 
the group. However, the revised OECD Guidelines75 also 
provide that an intra-group service is provided when the 
provision of the guarantee enhances the credit rating of 
the subsidiary from A to AAA – which thereby enables 
it to obtain a loan at 2%.76 The author agrees with this 
approach77 although it may be disputable.78
Continuing with the previous illustration, with respect 
to the second question, the arm’ s length guarantee fees 
should be determined as the difference between the inter-
est rate that the subsidiary can obtain on a stand-alone 
basis, as adjusted for implicit support (4%) and the inter-
72. The example assumes that the multinationals group rating is higher than 
the stand-alone rating of the subsidiary. However, there could be situ-
ations where the stand-alone rating of entities is higher than that of the 
group.
73. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 29, paras. 1.164-1.166 & paras. 
7.12-7.13.
74. CA: TCC, 4 Dec. 2009, General Electric Capital Canada, Inc. v. Her Majesty 
The Queen, 2009 TCC 563, aff ’d 2010 FCA 344 (1 Nov. 2010). See also 
Ledure et al., supra n. 3, at 352-353.
75. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 29, para. 1.167.
76. In contrast to the above illustration, assume that an independent bank, 
after analysing the financial position of the subsidiary, refuses to provide 
a loan. This is because the bank considers the subsidiary to be financially 
weak on a stand-alone basis. In such circumstances, if the parent company 
provides a guarantee subsequent to which the bank provides a loan to 
the subsidiary, it could be argued that an intra-group service is not pro-
vided even though the guarantee enhances the commercial position of 
the subsidiary. The OECD Guidelines provide that, in order to determine 
the arm’ s length price for intra-group services, the matter should be seen 
from the perspective of both the service provider and service recipient. 
In all likelihood, an independent enterprise would not provide a guaran-
tee, as it will not be willing to accept the risks associated with the trans-
action (as the subsidiary is financially weak). Thus, if the parent provides 
a guarantee, it would do so in its capacity as a shareholder. Accordingly, 
no remuneration should be charged, as the service amounts to a share-
holder activity. Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 33.
77. See e.g. the position of the Dutch tax authorities in Decree of 14 November 
2013, IFZ 2013/184M, International Tax Law. Transfer prices, application 
of the arm’ s length principle and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines). For an 
unofficial translation by KPMG Meijburg & Co/KPMG Global Transfer 
Pricing Services, see 21 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 2 (2014), Journals IBFD 
(Decree of 14 November 2013, IFZ 2013/184M).
78. See e.g. C. Schultz, National Foreign Trade Council, Comments on OECD 
Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles and White 
Paper on Transfer Pricing Documentation (30 Sept. 2013), at 4-5, avail-
able at http://www.nftc.org/default/Publications/Tax/Comments%20
OECD%20on%20the%20Intangibles.pdf.
est rate that the subsidiary can obtain as a result of the 
guarantee (2%). This would mean that the guarantee fee 
should be calculated within the ranges of 0% to 2%. If the 
borrower were to be required to pay the entire saving (2%) 
as the fee, it would not make sense for it to enter into the 
guarantee arrangement. At the same time, if the guarantee 
provider did not receive a share of the saving (2%), it would 
not make sense for it to enter into the guarantee arrange-
ment. Therefore, the synergistic benefit must be split. In 
these situations, the revised OECD Guidelines provide 
that it is necessary to split the benefits of the synergies 
among the participants in proportion to their respective 
contributions.79
2.4.2.  Application to cash pooling arrangements: The 
Portuguese Arbitration Tax Court decision80
Cross guarantees81 (or upstream82 or downstream83 guar-
antees) could be provided in cash pooling arrangements. 
Accordingly, it becomes imperative to analyse whether a 
guarantee fee is necessary. Ideally, if a guarantee issued by 
one entity within the group pushes up the credit rating of 
another entity over and above implicit support, a guaran-
tee fee may be payable. The following court case arrives 
at a similar conclusion, although the author understands 
that there was no discussion regarding implicit support.
A parent company and its Portuguese subsidiary (the tax-
payer) entered into a notional cash pooling arrangement 
with a Dutch bank with which they held bank accounts. 
Pursuant to the arrangement, the parent and the subsid-
iary provided cross-guarantees to each other for their 
respective account balances. In effect, this meant that each 
cash pool participant in the notional pool agreed to guar-
antee the liabilities (debit balances) of the other cash pool 
participants to the bank. In this case, the taxpayer had a 
good financial standing and had higher credit balances in 
comparison to its parent (which was in a deficit position). 
Further, even though the cash pool participants cross-
guaranteed each other, the risk of compensating the bank 
for debit balances of other cash pool participants never 
materialized during the year under audit. Moreover, in 
addition to virtually merging balances, certain clauses of 
the agreement restricted the subsidiary from obtaining 
loans from the Dutch bank, whereas no such restriction 
was placed on the parent entity. In other words, the parent 
had access only to the master account.
79. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 29, para. 1.162. In practice, the 
CUP method (credit default swaps, letter of credit fees, commitment fees), 
the cost benefit analysis approach, the contingent put option approach 
and the cost of capital method are used to price a guarantee fee payment. 
Bakker, supra n. 1, at 33; Russo & Moerer, supra n. 1, at 34.
80. F. Sousa & B. Santiago, Portuguese Arbitration Tax Court Rules on Notional 
Cash Pooling Arrangements, Tax Notes Intl. (3 June 2013), at 999-1003. See 
also C. Scholz et al., Comparison of the Tax Treatment of Inter Company 
Cash Pools in Europe, Transfer Pricing Intl. J. (BNA) (Apr. 2015). A proper 
analysis of this case could not be made due to non-availability of detailed 
facts. 
81. Typically, issued by group companies whereby all the group members are 
jointly and severally liable to the creditors (banks). PWC, supra n. 1, at 
146.
82. Typically, issued by subsidiaries to creditors (banks) for the benefit of the 
parent company. PWC, supra n. 1, at 146.
83. Typically, issued by parent companies to creditors (banks) for the benefit 
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The tax authorities argued that the taxpayer had provided 
a guarantee to the Dutch bank on behalf of the parent 
company in light of its strong financial position. This 
guarantee led the parent to obtain a higher credit rating, 
which in turn helped the parent to obtain better interest 
rates from the Dutch bank (on future loans). Further, as 
certain clauses of the agreement restricted the taxpayer 
from obtaining loans, in essence, the taxpayer had pro-
vided a guarantee to the parent. Accordingly, the parent 
should pay a guarantee fee to the subsidiary.
After reviewing the terms and conditions of the agreement 
in detail, the Portuguese Arbitration Tax Court held that, 
even though the arrangement was called a cash pooling 
arrangement, a proper analysis of the facts and circum-
stances (also the agreement clauses) of the taxpayer led 
the Court to believe that the arrangement was a contract 
of mixed nature which resulted in the subsidiary’ s pro-
viding a guarantee to the parent. The key takeaway from 
this case is that if the terms and conditions of the cash 
pooling arrangement differ from normal circumstances, 
courts could recharacterize such arrangements in light of 
their economic substance. This recharacterization mech-
anism is also supported by the OECD Guidelines (see 
section 2.2.). Accordingly, the contractual terms must be 
carefully reviewed prior to being executed.
Further, in notional arrangements which provide for 
cross-guarantees, it could be argued that an intra-group 
service is not provided, as independent enterprises do 
not enter into joint liability arrangements. In fact, the 
Dutch tax authorities consider that an explicit charge is 
not required, as cross-guarantees are put in place due to 
shareholder relations. Moreover, it is asserted that an intra-
group service is not rendered, as the joint liability of the 
cash pool participants – coupled with fluctuating cash 
pool balances – should offset benefits that could trigger a 
guarantee claim.84
In the author’ s opinion, a credit rating analysis of all the 
participants in a notional cash pool must be undertaken. 
Based on this analysis, the impact of cross-guarantees 
needs to be analysed. If it is established that the avail-
ability of the cross-guarantee pushes up the credit rating 
of the loan recipient (over and above implicit support), 
a fee should be payable. However, such fees should not 
be payable when the “fees are already priced in interest 
rates, for instance, if the external bank offers implicit guar-
antee providers with more favourable interest rates and 
implicit guarantee receivers less favourable interest rates 
in the context of the cash pool” 85
2.5.  Arm’ s length remuneration for the cash pool 
leader
The arm’ s length remuneration for the cash pool leader 
depends on the functions it performs, risks it assumes and 
assets it employs. In physical cash pooling arrangements, 
the cash pool leader may act as an internal bank. In such 
cases, due to its entrepreneurial activities, the cash pool 
84. Scholz et al., supra n. 80, section IV B.
85. Scholz et al., supra n. 80, section V B.
leader’ s remuneration should ideally consist of the dif-
ference between the debit and credit interest rates.86 The 
interest rate spread is directly proportional to the amount 
of equity that the cash pool leader owns. The larger the 
amount of equity, the higher is the interest rate spread (and 
vice versa). This is because a higher amount of equity leads 
to a higher credit rating for the cash pool leader. In these 
situations, the cash pool leader makes a profit on the inter-
est spread and does not receive any separate/additional 
remuneration from the other cash pool participants.87 In 
all likelihood, in the in-house bank structure, the cash pool 
leader’ s credit rating will not be similar to that of a bank. 
Accordingly, if the cash pool leader were receiving depos-
its from and lending to the same entity, a spread that an 
independent bank could enjoy would not be available to 
the cash pool leader.
On the other hand, if the cash pool leader were to act as 
a service provider (see section 2.3.3.2., Bombardier case), 
it should be entitled to a service fee.88 This is because it 
does not bear any risks with such arrangements. In these 
situations, a method based upon costs (the cost-plus 
method or the transactional net margin method) or a 
limited basis point spread could be applied to determine 
the arm’ s length fee that the cash pool leader is entitled 
to.89 Such could be the case in physical or notional cash 
pooling arrangements where the cash pool leader has a 
limited functional and risk profile.
2.6.  Sharing the cash pool benefit
Cash pooling benefits (or losses) arise in light of multina-
tional group synergies. They result from deliberate con-
certed action of group members. As discussed, the revised 
OECD Guidelines provide that benefits of such synergies 
should be shared among the participants in proportion 
to their respective contributions.90 Thus, if the cash pool 
leader acts as an in-house bank, it could be argued that a 
major part of the cash pool benefit should be allocated to 
the cash pool leader. This is because the cash pool leader 
performs substantial functions and undertakes major risks 
associated with the arrangement.91 On the other hand, if 
the cash pool leader does not perform substantial func-
tions or undertake substantial risks associated with the 
arrangement, but merely acts as a service provider (in 
physical or notional arrangements), the cash pool leader 
should not be entitled to the a major part of the cash pool 
benefit. In these situations, a major part of the cash pool 
benefit should be allocated to the cash pool participants 
in light of their respective contributions.
86. The cash pool leader may provide guarantees to the cash pool participants, 
and could also be entitled to a guarantee fees.
87. PWC, supra n. 1, at 141; Bakker, supra n. 1, at 31; Russo & Moerer, supra 
n. 1, at 44.
88. OECD Guidelines, para. 7.14.
89. PWC, supra n. 1, at 141; Bakker, supra n. 1, at 31; Russo & Moerer, supra 
n. 1, at 44.
90. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 29, para. 1.162.
91. This would be the case if the cash pool leader, legally and economically, 
bears all the risks associated with the arrangement. Russo & Moerer, supra 
n. 1, at 44; PWC, supra n. 1, at 142.
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Cash Pooling Arrangements in Light of the BEPS Action Plan
45© IBFD INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016
Depending on the factual circumstances, the residual 
profit split method92 could be applied, in principle, to split 
the cash pooling benefit. Imagine, in an external bank/
notional cash pooling structure, that the bank pays the 
entire pool benefit (interest on positive balances) to the 
cash pool leader. In situations where the cash pool leader 
acts as a service provider, the cash pool leader could retain 
a service fee for the activities it carries out. Thereafter, the 
remaining cash pool benefit could be allocated to cash 
pool participants on the basis of certain allocation keys 
that showcase their contributions (such as the size of the 
account balances of different entities).93
2.7.  Cash pooling documentation
As a best practice, it is recommended that multination-
als clearly document their cash pooling policy in their 
transfer pricing documentation. Essentially, the following 
information should be reflected: (i) a description of the 
cash pool, (ii) the terms and conditions between the cash 
pool leader, cash pool participants and external parties 
(banks), (iii) the intra-group transactions, (iv) a functional 
analysis of the arrangement which clearly outlines the roles 
and responsibilities of the cash pool members94 and (v) the 
selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method 
for the various intra-group transactions, in particular the 
arm’ s length interest rates and guarantee fees, the remu-
neration for the cash pool leader and the allocation of the 
cash pool benefit.95 This documentation serves to justify 
the nature of the taxpayer’ s dealings in the event of a trans-
fer pricing audit (a circumstance that is currently on the 
rise).
3.  Impact of Other BEPS Actions on Cash Pooling
3.1.  Domestic law changes
Action 4 of the BEPS initiative96 deals with the perceived 
need to limit interest deductions. The Final Report pro-
vides recommendations for designing domestic law pro-
visions to prevent base erosion through the use of (excess) 
interest expense deductions. Essentially, a fixed ratio rule 
is recommended to restrict interest deductions.97 In par-
ticular, the rule restricts the deduction of a group entity’ s 
interest payment to a percentage of that entity’ s earn-
ings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA). The recommendation leaves open the possi-
92. The profit split method can be applied to such arrangements, as they 
are “highly integrated”. OECD Guidelines, para. 2.109. This is because 
pooling the balance of all cash pool participants generates profits under 
such arrangements. See also J. Hülshorst, The Profit Split Method in Cash 
Pooling Transactions, Transfer Pricing Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 2005).
93. Assef & Boer, supra n. 31. The OECD has indicated that it will provide 
detailed guidance on splitting synergistic benefits in the follow-up work 
on transfer pricing methods. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Reports, supra n. 
29, at 58-61.
94. Regarding the steps in a functional analysis, see OECD, Actions 8-10 Final 
Reports, supra n. 29, paras. 1.51-1.106.
95. A. Roeder & S. Kuzmina, Germany, in Transfer Pricing and Intra-Group 
Financing, supra n. 1, at 260-261.
96. OECD, Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments – Action 4: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing 5 Oct. 2015), In-
ternational Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
97. OECD, Action 4 Final Report, supra n. 96, at 11.
bility for countries to choose a percentage between 10% 
and 30% based on certain parameters.98 Furthermore, the 
Report recommends countries to incorporate a group 
ratio rule alongside the fixed ratio rule. This approach 
would enable entities with net interest expense above a 
country’ s fixed ratio rule to deduct interest up to the level 
of the net interest/EBITDA ratio of its worldwide group. 
The Report acknowledges that Actions 8 through 10 also 
affect Action 4,99 and also highlights that further work will 
be undertaken with respect to transfer pricing aspects of 
financial transactions (by the end of 2017). Accordingly, 
Action 4 could restrict the deduction of interest paid by 
entities in a cash pooling arrangement, even if they are 
at arm’ s length. Consequently, cash pooling (depending 
on the structure) may result in effective double taxation 
because interest income will be taxable in the country of 
the depositors and the corresponding interest expense 
may be non-deductible in the country of the debtor. Thus, 
it is suggested that the OECD100 provide guidance on this 
topic, as it is essential.101
Action 3 of the BEPS Action Plan102 deals with controlled 
foreign company (CFC) rules. The Final Report provides 
recommendations in the form of building blocks for 
designing CFC rules. Essentially, building blocks are pro-
vided with respect to (i) the definition of a CFC, (ii) CFC 
exemption and threshold requirements, (iii) the definition 
of CFC income, (iv) the computation of CFC income, (v) 
the attribution of a CFC’ s income to its shareholder and 
(vi) rules regarding the prevention of double taxation.103 
The Report provides countries the flexibility to design their 
CFC rules, taking into consideration their overall policy 
objectives. It could well be possible that income (interest or 
services income)104 derived by a cash pool leader’ s (when 
it operate as an in-house bank or a service entity), even 
though the transaction is at arm’ s length, could be subject 
to CFC rules in the parent’ s country. This would be the 
case if the cash pooling arrangement were operated from 
a low-tax country.105 Accordingly, taxpayers should take 
into consideration the applicability of the CFC rules of 
the parent’ s country vis-à-vis cash pooling arrangements.
98. Id.
99. OECD, Action 4 Final Report, supra n. 96, at 12.
100. Although the OECD has already indicated that the application of a group-
wide rule should not impact the ability of a group to manage its third-
party balances through cash pooling. OECD, Discussion Draft, BEPS 
Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 18 Dec. 2014), para. 138.
101. Duff & Phelps, Comments Pertaining to the Public Discussion Draft on 
Deductibility of Interest and Other Financial Payments, in OECD, Com-
ments Received on Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 4: Interest 
Deductions and Other Financial Payments – Part 1 (OECD 11 Feb. 2015), 
at 363-372.
102. OECD, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules – Action 3: 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 
5 Oct. 2014), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
103. OECD, Action 3 Final Report, supra n. 102, at 9.
104. OECD, Action 3 Final Report, supra n. 102, at 43-55.
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3.2.  Treaty law changes
Action 6 of the BEPS Action Plan106 deals with prevent-
ing treaty abuse. The Final Report suggests that countries 
incorporate a minimum standard by changing the title and 
preamble of their treaties to reflect the objective of pre-
venting tax evasion and tax avoidance (including treaty 
shopping), coupled with either (i) a principal purpose test 
and limitation on benefits clause, (ii) a limitation on bene-
fits clause with a narrow principal purpose test for conduit 
financing situations or (iii) only a principal purpose test.107 
Furthermore, the Report suggests other treaty-related 
changes to combat other tax avoidance structures (typi-
cally, rule shopping).108  It could well be possible that a 
treasury entity of a group (or cash pool leader) does not 
satisfy the stringent requirements under the limitation on 
benefits clause in order to qualify as a resident of a con-
tracting state due to its scant economic substance109 and 
the fact that it derives or pays interest from/to foreign 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, interest paid by the net debtors 
in a cash pooling arrangement could be exposed to high 
withholding taxes in the source state if treaty benefits are 
denied to the cash pool leader. Thus, taxpayers should take 
into consideration the impact of these treaty law changes 
on cash pooling arrangements.
4.  The Way Forward: Dispute Resolution and 
Prevention
Multinational groups consider transfer pricing issues with 
respect to intra-group finance as a leading area of contro-
versy.110 The ConocoPhillips, Bombardier and Portuguese 
Arbitration Tax Court cases clearly show that the tax 
authorities have started to question the arm’ s length nature 
of cash pooling arrangements. Moreover, it has been pre-
dicted that the BEPS project will result in increased tax 
106. OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circum-
stances – Action 6: 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project (OECD 5 Oct. 2015), International Organizations’ Docu-
mentation IBFD.
107. OECD, Action 6 Final Report, supra n. 106, at 10.
108. Id.
109. Reports indicate that cash pooling arrangements are operated from 
Ireland with one to four employees. See J. Duffy, Ireland, in Transfer Pricing 
and Intra-Group Financing, supra n. 1, at 320-321.
110. T. Borstell et al., Navigating the Choppy Waters of International Tax: EY’ s 
2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey (2013), at 25.
and transfer pricing disputes.111 Accordingly, given the fact 
that tax administrations could take aggressive positions 
regarding cash pooling arrangements, it becomes imper-
ative for taxpayers to maintain robust documentation by 
carefully considering and documenting all functions per-
formed, assets used and risks assumed, as well as the bar-
gaining power of all related parties.
This would provide a solid foundation for avoiding 
common pitfalls in cash pooling arrangements, such as 
(i) applying debit and credit interest rates without under-
taking a credit rating analysis of the cash pool leader/cash 
pool participant or applying such rates in light of external 
bank quotes, (ii) allocating the entire cash pool benefit to 
the cash pool leader even though it does not bear any sub-
stantial risks and (iii) maintaining long-term positions in 
the cash pool even though the arrangement, essentially, is 
to fund short-term working capital requirements.112 For 
arrangements that are already in cross-border litigation, 
taxpayers should evaluate the possibility of entering into 
a mutual agreement procedure under an applicable treaty 
that contains an equivalent to article 25 of the OECD 
Model113 (or arbitration). Needless to say, if the taxpayer 
would like to prevent double taxation and obtain upfront 
certainty prior to actually implementing such arrange-
ments, it might consider entering into a unilateral or (pref-
erably) bilateral APA (or even – when possible – a multi-
lateral APA) with the relevant jurisdiction(s).114
111. Chand & Wagh, supra n. 27, at 408. See also C.H. Lowell & M. Herrington, 
BEPS: Current Reality and Planning in Anticipation, 21 Intl. Transfer 
Pricing J. 2 (2014), Journals IBFD; M. Herrington & C.H. Lowell, The 
BEPS Project: Planning in Anticipation, 21 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 3 (2014), 
Journals IBFD.
112. Bakker, supra n. 1, at 32.
113. Article 25 of the OECD Model provides for a dispute resolution mecha-
nism that is also applicable for transfer pricing disputes. Currently, the 
MAP process, which also provides for an optional arbitration mecha-
nism, is considered to be ineffective. The OECD, in light of Action 14 
of the BEPS Action Plan, seeks to make dispute resolution mechanisms 
more effective. Essentially, the Final Report provides for implementation 
of minimum standards through a robust peer-based monitoring mecha-
nism. In addition to committing to the minimum standard, several coun-
tries have also expressed their interest in implementing the mandatory 
arbitration clauses in their tax treaties. OECD, Making Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms More Effective – Action 14: 2015 Final Report (OECD 5 Oct. 
2015), at 9-10, International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
114. P. Jain & V. Chand, Location Savings: International and Indian Perspective, 
43 Intertax 2 (2014), at 196-197.
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